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MISSOURI STATUTE ATTACKS "VIOLENT" VIDEOS:
ARE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS IN DANGER?
I. INTRODUCTION
When a St. Louis, Missouri mother came home from work one day,
she was horrified to find her 12-year old son and a group of his friends
gathered around the family's television set, watching a movie in which a
graphic rape was followed by the victim's revenge: castration of her at-
tackers.1 Compounding her cofisternation was the realization that her
child had rented this so-called "slasher" film at the corner grocery store.
Her reaction led one of her friends to contact Missouri State Representa-
tive Douglas Harpool, who sponsored a bill to address the mother's
concerns.2
When Missouri Governor John Ashcroft signed the resulting "Mis-
souri Violence Bill"'3 ("Bill") into law on June 20, 1989,' he described the
Bill's provisions as dealing with a "new class of pornography . .. that
cater[s] to a morbid interest in violence." 5 Harpool stated, "Missouri is
the first state in the nation to declare excessively violent movies off-limits
to minors. It will not be the last .... I believe Missouri has taken a bold
and imperative step."6
While those affected by the Bill may question if this action is a "bold
and imperative step," the Bill definitely seeks changes in the way that
videocassettes are rented, displayed and sold. Under the Bill's provi-
sions, videocassettes, other video reproduction devices and their jackets,
cases or coverings are to be displayed or maintained in a separate area
1. No 'Slasher' Movies for Missouri Kids, GOVERNING, Aug. 1989, at 13-14.
2. Id. at 14.
3. Conference Committee Substitute for House Committee Substitute for House Bill No.
225, 85th General Assembly. The bill repealed Mo. REV. STAT. (Supp. 1988) § 573.010, relat-
ing to pornography and enacted three new sections known as §§ 573.010, 573.011 and 573.012.
This comment only addresses § 573.011.
4. "Show Me" State Won't Show Violence, HOLLYWOOD REP., Aug. 25, 1989, at 22.
5. "Ashcroft Signs Video Bill," United Press Int'l, June 21, 1989 (NEXIS, videos).
6. Slasher Video Law Draws Contrasting Reviews, THE STATESMAN, July 1989, at 6.
Other states have considered or are considering video violence bills similar to the one enacted
in Missouri. According to Business Week, video violence bills were pending in at least eight
states, including Ohio, Massachusetts and Texas. BUs. WEEK, Sept. 11, 1989, at 34. In the
early part of 1989, the Texas Legislature considered and later defeated Texas House Bill 328,
which would have forbidden the sale or rental to minors of videocassettes defined as "graphi-
cally violent." Text of defeated Texas House Bill 328, proposed amendment to Penal Code,
ch. 43, § 43.27.
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and not rented or sold to persons under the age of seventeen if they meet
the following three-part violence test:
(1) Taken as a whole and applying contemporary community
standards, the average person would find that it has a tendency
to cater or appeal to morbid interest in violence for persons
under the age of seventeen; and
(2) It depicts violence in a way which is patently offensive to
the average person applying contemporary adult community
standards with respect to what is suitable for a person under
the age of seventeen; and
(3) Taken as a whole, it lacks serious literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value for persons under the age of seventeen.7
On August 21, 1989, one week before the Bill was to take effect, the
Motion Picture Association of America ("MPAA"), the Video Software
Dealers Association ("VSDA") and the Missouri Retailers Association
("MRA") filed a suit to challenge the constitutionality of the Missouri
statute.8 In a press release announcing the lawsuit, Video Software Deal-
ers Association v. Webster, 9 MPAA's president and chief executive officer
Jack Valenti stated, "We have joined in this action because we believe the
Missouri bill impermissibly extends the boundaries of content regulation
far beyond the standards established by the Supreme Court in Miller v.
California 10 and as a result infringes on the First Amendment
freedoms." 11
On August 24, 1989, Judge Brook Bartlett of the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Western District in Kansas City, Missouri heard argu-
ments from both sides on the merits of an injunction preventing
enforcement of the Bill. 12 James Mercurio, a Washington attorney repre-
7. Mo. REV. STAT. (Supp. 1990) § 573.01 l(1). The Missouri statute closely parallels
defeated Texas House Bill 328. Under the Texas bill,
'Graphically violent' means material or a performance that:
(A) depicts, displays, describes, represents, or portrays violence against persons
within a sexual context, actual human execution or violent death, cannibalism, dis-
memberment, sexual mutilation, animal slaughter, or ritualistic killing;
(B) is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as a
whole with respect to what is suitable for minors; and
(C) is utterly without redeeming social value for minors.
Texas House Bill 328, proposed amendment to Penal Code, ch. 43, § 43.27.
8. HOLLYWOOD REP., Aug. 28, 1989, at 7.
9. No. 89-4353-CV-C-9 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 25, 1989).
10. 413 U.S. 15 (1972). In Miller, the United States Supreme Court created a three-part
standard by which local communities could determine if the subject matter in question was
obscene.
11. Joint press release from MPAA, MRA and VSDA dated August 21, 1989, and entitled
"Industry Coalition Challenges Missouri 'Violence' Statute."
12. Kansas City Times, Aug. 25, 1989, at 4, col. 3.
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senting the interests of the MPAA, VSDA and MRA, emphasized the
Bill's vague and overly broad reach: "Is the violence of a football game
something that comes under this law? We don't know. [The Missouri
Violence Bill] is simply censorship of a form of rather ill-defined con-
tent."" a Kathy Mescher, an assistant Missouri attorney general, coun-
tered that the statute did not violate the Missouri and United States
Constitutions simply because the law "breaks new ground" in regulating
minors' access to violent videos. "Yes, it is a new law," Mescher stated,
"but so were the laws we have that regulate pornography .... If we use
one test for pornography, we can use one test for violence."' 4
In issuing a temporary restraining order delaying implementation of
the Missouri Violence Bill, Judge Bartlett said the law needed further
examination since it could have a chilling effect on first amendment
rights.' 5 "The gray areas are the important ones in this case," the judge
stated at the hearing, "because that's where a prosecutor and store owner
could have a difference of opinion which could get the store owner in
trouble."' 6 The restraining order is binding on the state Attorney Gen-
eral and "a class defined by the judge as all persons in the State who are
empowered to enforce the provisions" of the Bill.' 7
This comment will analyze why Judge Bartlett should rule the Mis-
souri Violence Bill unconstitutional and why failure to do so could se-
verely erode first amendment expression by those whose views may be
unpopular with a majority of the public.
II. FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTS ALL BUT NARROWLY DEFINED
FORMS OF SPEECH
On its face, the first amendment to the United States Constitution
provides a strong prohibition against any governmental action regulating
speech or the press: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press ... 8 The Supreme Court empha-
sized this point in Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, '9 a case involving a





17. Press release Judge Bartlett ordered issued on August 25, 1989, and entitled "Court
Restricts Enforcement of Missouri Video Violence Act." According to attorneys involved
with the case, Judge Bartlett was expected to hear arguments in the case in January or Febru-
ary of 1990, with a final ruling expected later this year.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
19. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
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the protest.2 ° In overturning the statute, the Court said, "[A]bove all
else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to re-
strict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its
content." 21
From this broad definition of protected expression, the Supreme
Court carved out narrow exceptions to the rule in Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire. 
22
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of
speech, the prevention and punishment of which has never been
thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the
lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or
'fighting' words - those which by their very utterance inflict
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.23
In New York v. Ferber, 24 the Supreme Court added child pornography to
the list of speech unprotected by the first amendment.
III. MISSOURI VIOLENCE BILL DOES NOT FALL INTO ANY OF THE
EXCEPTIONS TO FIRST AMENDMENT EXPRESSION
A. Clear and Present Danger of Inciting an Imminent
Breach of the Peace
Under the clear and present danger exception to the first amend-
ment, certain speech may be restricted if the speech in question presents
a clear and present danger of inciting an immediate breach of peace.25 In
Whitney v. California, 26 the United States Supreme Court considered a
case in which a woman was convicted under the Criminal Syndicalism
20. Id. at 92-93. At issue in this case was the constitutionality of a Chicago ordinance
stating that a person had committed disorderly conduct when he knowingly
(i) Pickets or demonstrates on a public way within 150 feet of any primary or secon-
dary school building while the school is in session and one-half hour before the
school is in session and one-half hour after the school session has been concluded,
provided that this subsection does not prohibit the peaceful picketing of any school
involved in a labor dispute .... Municipal Code, c.193-1(i).
(cited in Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 92-93 (1972)).
21. Id. at 95.
22. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
23. Id. at 571-72 (footnote omitted). The Supreme Court cited with favor the majority of
this quotation in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 20-21 (1973), a landmark case which set up
the standard for judging allegedly obscene matter, and in New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747,
754 (1982), a case challenging the constitutionality of a New York child pornography law.
24. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
25. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72.




Act of California27 because of her involvement and leadership in the
Communist Labor Party. Although the moderate viewpoints she advo-
cated were defeated and more radical views adopted, Whitney remained
a member of the organization. At her trial, however, she testified "that it
was not her intention that the Communist Labor Party of California
should be an instrument of terrorism or violence."28 In upholding the
conviction, the Supreme Court stated the statute was not an unwarrant-
able infringement of any right of free speech, assembly or association.
29
In a concurring opinion, Justice Brandeis (joined by Justice Holmes)
provided his "clear and present danger" exception which allowed regula-
tion of speech in certain situations. "In order to support a finding of
clear and present danger [,] it must be shown either that immediate seri-
ous violence was to be expected or was advocated, or that the past con-
duct furnished reason to believe that such advocacy was then
contemplated."
30
During the decades that followed, the courts grappled with what
constituted a clear and present danger with varying results.3 In Dennis
v. United States ("Dennis"),3 2 a case decided during the height of the
Cold War that involved the leaders of the Communist Party in the
United States, the Court noted that the right of free speech was not an
unlimited right, but occasionally must be subordinated to other values
and considerations. 33 "In each case [courts] must ask whether the grav-
ity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of
27. 1919 Cal. Stat., ch. 58, p. 88. The pertinent provisions of the Act stated:
[slection 1. term 'criminal syndicalism' as used in this act is hereby defined as any
doctrine or precept advocating, teaching or aiding and abetting the commission of
crime, sabotage, or unlawful acts of force and violence or unlawful methods of terror-
ism as a means of accomplishing a change in industrial ownership or control, or
effecting any political change. Sec. 2. Any person who: ... 4. Organizes or assists in
organizing, or is or knowingly becomes a member of, any organization, society,
group or assemblage of persons organized or assembled to advocate, teach or aid and
abet criminal syndicalism...
Is guilty of a felony and punishable by imprisonment.
(cited in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 359-60 (1927)).
28. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 366.
29. Id. at 372.
30. Id. at 376.
31. For example, see Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927) (holding unconstitutional an
application of the Kansas version of criminal syndicalism law); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S.
353 (1937) (setting aside a conviction under Oregon's criminal syndicalism legislation); and
Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937) (overturning a conviction for an "attempt to incite
insurrection" based on first amendment grounds and vagueness).
32. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
33. Id. at 503.
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free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger." 4 In Dennis, the peti-
tioners intended to overthrow the United States government as quickly
as possible.35 The Justices determined that the situation posed a very
serious threat to the future of the country. 6 Thus, the Court deter-
mined, the petitioners' conspiracy and advocacy "created a 'clear and
present danger' of an attempt to overthrow the Government by force and
violence."
37
The current standard for the clear and present danger test was
stated in Brandenburg v. Ohio, " in which the Supreme Court reviewed
the case of a Ku Klux Klan ("KKK") leader who was convicted under
the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism statute39 for leading a KKK rally.' In
his speech, the KKK leader told the white-hooded listeners:
The Klan has more members in the State of Ohio than does any
other organization. We're not a revengent organization, but if
our President, our Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to
suppress the white, Caucasian race, it's possible that there
might have to be some revengeance taken.
We are marching on Congress July the Fourth, four hun-
dred thousand strong. From there we are dividing into two
groups, one group to march on St. Augustine, Florida, the
other group to march into Mississippi .... "
In overturning the conviction and expressly overruling Whitney, the
Court considered decisions42 which held that freedom of speech and free-
dom of the press do not permit a state to forbid advocacy of the use of
34. Id. at 510.
35. Id. at 516-17.
36. Id.
37. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 516-17.
38. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
39. The statute forbade "advocat[ing] ... the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, sabo-
tage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or
political reform and voluntarily assembl[ing] with any society, group, assemblage of persons
formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism." OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2923.13. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 444-45.
40. Brandenburg, the appellant in this case, telephoned a reporter at a local television
station and invited him to attend the KKK rally. The reporter and a cameraman attended and
filmed the event. Part of the film was later broadcast on the local TV station and a national
network. The prosecutor based his case on the films and on testimony identifying Branden-
burg as the person who spoke with the reporter and at the rally. Id. at 445.
41. Id. at 446.
42. See Hemdon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 259-61 (1937), Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 134
(1966), and Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961). In Noto, the court stated, "the mere
abstract teaching ... of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and
violence is not the same as preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such action."
Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448 (citing Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297-98 (1961)).
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force or violation of the law "except where such advocacy is directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such action." 43
Since the Ohio statute punished mere advocacy and forbade "assem-
bly with others merely to advocate the described type of action[,]" the
Court said that such a statute fell "within the condemnation of the First
and Fourteenth Amendments."'  The Court then overruled Whitney v.
California since its contrary teachings could not be supported by recent
Court decisions.45
1. Recent Court Decisions Have Held that Contested Movies and
Television Shows Did Not Meet the Clear and Present
Danger Test
Although the United States Supreme Court and various courts of
appeal have not considered whether the violence portrayed in movies,
television or videocassettes is subject to a "clear and present danger" test,
several cases have been decided at the federal district court and state
appellate level.46
In Zamora v. CBS, " a United States District Court considered a
case where a 15-year old boy and his parents sued the three major televi-
sion networks.48 The boy had been convicted of killing his 83-year old
neighbor.49 The suit claimed that the boy's violent sociopathic behavior
was the result of his becoming involuntarily "addicted to and 'completely
subliminally intoxicated'" by extensive viewing of television violence
during the previous ten years.50
The federal district court noted that "there is '... no doubt that
43. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447-48. In the footnote directly following this sentence, the
court said,
[i]t was on the theory that the Smith Act, 54 Stat. 670, 18 U.S.C. § 2385, embodied
such a principle and that it had been applied only in conformity with it that this
Court sustained the Act's constitutionality. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494
(1951). That this was the basis for Dennis was emphasized in Yates v. United States,
354 U.S. 298, 320-24 (1957), in which the Court overturned convictions for advocacy
of the forcible overthrow of the Government under the Smith Act, because the trial
judge's instructions had allowed conviction for mere advocacy, unrelated to its ten-
dency to produce forcible action.
44. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 449.
45. Id.
46. Zamora v. CBS, 480 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Fla. 1979) and Olivia N. v. NBC, 126 Cal.
App. 3d 488, 178 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1982) are discussed later in this subsection.
47. 480 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
48. At that time, the major TV networks were Columbia Broadcasting System ("CBS"),
American Broadcasting Company ("ABC") and National Broadcasting Company ("NBC").
49. Zamora, 480 F. Supp. at 200.
50. Id.
1990]
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moving pictures, like newspapers and radio, are included in the press
whose freedom is guaranteed by the First Amendment . . . . "' In the
court's opinion, the action alleged in the plaintiffs' complaint did not ap-
pear to fall into any of the exceptions to first amendment free speech
outlined in Chaplinsky. 52 The complaint did not suggest that the boy's
killing of the elderly woman was a reaction to a specific program of an
inflammatory nature or that the minor was "incited" or goaded into un-
lawful behavior by a particular call to action. 3 In dismissing the action,
the court stated:
this Court lacks the legal and institutional capacity to identify
isolated depictions of violence, let alone the ability to set the
standard for media dissemination of items containing "vio-
lence" in one form or the other .... The importance of the
First Amendment to our freedoms as a whole cannot be over-
emphasized. It is the lens through which the operations of gov-
ernment are viewed and the support and protection for the
commentary which may result. Thus any action, legislative or
otherwise[,] which has as its purpose placing limitations upon
freedom of expression must be viewed with suspicion. 4
In Olivia N. v. NBC, " the California Court of Appeals considered a
case in which a nine-year old girl was forcibly "artificially raped" with a
bottle by minors at a San Francisco beach.56 The plaintiff alleged that
the assailants had viewed and discussed an artificial rape scene in Born
Innocent, a television film about the harmful effect of a state-run home
upon an adolescent girl who had become a ward of the state.57
51. Id. at 203 (citing United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948)).
52. "Those areas which are not afforded constitutional protection include 'the lewd and
obscene, the profane, the libelous and the insulting or 'fighting' words.'" Zamora, 480 F.
Supp. at 202 (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
53. Zamora, 480 F. Supp. at 202.
54. Id. at 203.
55. 126 Cal. App. 3d 488, 178 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1982).
56. Id. at 492, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 888 (citing Olivia N. v. NBC, 74 Cal. App. 3d 383, 386,
141 Cal. Rptr. 511 (1977)).
57. Id. at 491-92, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 891. The court described the action that took place in
the movie:
[i]n one scene of the film, the young girl enters the community bathroom of the
facility to take a shower. She is then shown taking off her clothes and stepping into
the shower, where she bathes for a few moments. Suddenly, the water stops and a
look of fear comes across her face. Four adolescent girls are standing across from
her in the shower room. One of the girls is carrying a 'plumber's helper,' waving it
suggestively by her side. The four girls violently attack the younger girl, wrestling
her to the floor. The young girl is shown naked from the waist up, struggling as the
older girls force her legs apart. Then, the television film shows the girl with the
plumber's helper making intense thrusting motions with the handle of the plunger
[Vol. lO
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Before impaneling a jury, the trial court viewed the film, determined
that the film did not serve to incite the violence and depraved conduct
committed against the plaintiff, and rendered judgment for the defend-
ants. 8 The court of appeals reversed, stating that the judge violated the
appellant's right to trial by jury by acting as a fact finder.59
On remand, plaintiff's attorney acknowledged in his opening state-
ment his inability to meet the Brandenburg incitement test.' After de-
termining that the plaintiff had to prove incitement in order to win the
case, the court granted defendant's motion for a judgment of nonsuit and
dismissed the action.6'
On appeal, the plaintiff contended that where there was negligence,
liability could constitutionally be imposed despite the absence of proof of
incitement as defined in Brandenburg. 62 The court rejected the argu-
ment, stating "the chilling effect of permitting negligence actions for a
television broadcast is obvious. 'The fear of damage awards ... may be
markedly more inhibiting than the fear of prosecution under a criminal
statute.' "63
The court noted that the effect of imposing liability "could reduce
the [United States] adult population to viewing only what is fit for chil-
dren."'  The California Court of Appeals applied the Brandenburg in-
citement test to uphold the trial court's determination that the first
amendment barred the plaintiff's claim.65
Based on judicial analysis of relevant precedent in Zamora and
Olivia N., and on the strict Brandenburg requirement that unprotected
speech must be likely to incite or produce imminent lawless action,66 the
until one of the four girls says, 'That's enough.' The young girl is left sobbing and
naked on the floor.
Id.
58. Olivia N., 126 Cal. App. 3d at 490, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 890.
59. Id., 178 Cal. Rptr. at 890.
60. Id. at 491, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 890.
Appellant's counsel stated that: 'The plaintiffs in this case at no time in this trial are
going to prove what is known as 'incitement.' At no time in this trial are we going to
prove that either through negligence or recklessness there was incitement, which in-
citement is telling someone to go out encouraging them, directing them, advising
them, that there will be no evidence that NBC ever told anybody or incited anyone to
go out and rape a girl with an artificial instrument or in any other way.'
Id. at 491 n.l, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 890 n.l.
61. Id. at 491, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 890.
62. Olivia N., 126 Cal. App. 3d at 492, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 891.
63. Id. at 494, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 892 (citing New York v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277
(1964)).
64. Id. at 494-95, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 893.
65. Id. at 495, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 893.
66. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
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Missouri Violence Bill and the videocassettes the Bill attempts to regu-
late would not likely fall within this exception to the first amendment.
As the United States Supreme Court noted in Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v.
Wilson, 67 motion pictures are included in the free speech and free press
guaranty of the first and fourteenth amendments.6" Thus, despite the
fact that legislators or their constituents may not approve of a certain
videocassette, the Supreme Court has consistently held that in areas
outside obscenity, "the fact that protected speech may be offensive to
some does not justify its suppression."69 Short of a videotape urging
viewers to immediately go out and harm or kill a certain minority group,
it is inconceivable that any videocassette could reach the level of incite-
ment required by Brandenburg 70 to fall within the clear and present dan-
ger test and thus be subject to the kind of regulation contemplated by the
Missouri Bill.
B. Fighting or Insulting Words
The fighting or insulting words exception to the first amendment
also does not apply to "violent" videocassettes because the videos are not
intended or likely to produce imminent disorder.7" The first major case
in this area, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 72 carved out an exception to
the first amendment for "fighting words." In that case, the Supreme
Court upheld the conviction of a Jehovah's Witness who was distributing
religious literature and attracting a "restless crowd" by calling religion a
"racket." 73
In an exchange with the city marshall, Chaplinsky called the mar-
shall a "damned racketeer" and a "damned Fascist."74 Based on these
statements, Chaplinsky was convicted under a state law which forbade
any person from using offensive, derisive or annoying language to an-
other person who was lawfully in a public place.75 In affirming the con-
viction, the Court stated that since the statute was narrowly drawn and
punished specific conduct within the domain of state power, the statute
67. 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
68. Id. at 502.
69. Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 701 (1977).
70. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
71. Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973) (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,
447 (1969)).
72. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
73. Id. at 569-70.
74. Id. at 569.
75. Id. (citing ch. 378, § 2, of the Public Laws of New Hampshire).
[Vol. 10
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did not violate the constitutional right of free expression. 76
Despite the Court's holding, Chaplinsky has not been relied upon by
the Court in its subsequent examinations of offensive speech issues. 7
For example, in the landmark case of Cohen v. California, 78 the Supreme
Court considered the conviction of a man under a California law for
"willfully disturb[ing] the peace or quiet of any neighborhood or person
... by... offensive conduct ....79 Cohen's illegal conduct was wearing
a jacket with the words "Fuck the Draft" in a corridor of the Los Ang-
eles County Courthouse.8°
In overturning the conviction, the Court said that to eliminate
speech solely for protecting others from hearing it, the government must
show that "substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essen-
tially intolerable manner ... "81 The Court noted that while the word
displayed by Cohen is often used in a personally provocative fashion, no
person present could reasonably have regarded the words on Cohen's
jacket as a direct insult.8 2 Thus, the Court concluded that an " 'undiffer-
entiated fear or apprehension of disturbance .. is not enough to over-
come the right to freedom of expression.' " 83
In a similar case decided two years later, Hess v. Indiana, 84 the
Supreme Court overturned the conviction 5 of an antiwar demonstrator
on a college campus who loudly stated, "We'll take the fucking street
later (or again)."8a6 The Court found that, "at worst, [the statement]
amounted to nothing more than advocacy of illegal action at some indefi-
nite future time."1
8 7
The Court found that since there was no evidence or rational infer-
ence that his words were intended to or likely to produce "imminent
disorder, those words could not be punished by the State on the ground
that they had a 'tendency to lead to violence.' "88
Based on the language of the fighting and insulting words exception,
76. Id. at 573.
77. G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1049 (11 th ed. 1985).
78. 403 U.S. 15 (1971), reh'g denied, 404 U.S. 876 (1971).
79. Id. at 16 n.1 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 415 (West 1982)).
80. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 16.
81. Id. at 21.
82. Id. at 20.
83. Id. at 23 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
508 (1969)).
84. 414 U.S. 105 (1973).
85. Id. at 105 n.l. Hess was convicted under the Indiana disorderly conduct statute.
86. Hess, 414 U.S. at 107.
87. Id. at 108.
88. Id. at 109.
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videocassettes would have to contain words which would tend to incite
imminent disorder for regulation to be allowed under this exception.
Yet, according to the plain language of the Bill, the statute is designed to
regulate videocassettes containing action that "depicts violence in a way
which is patently offensive .... ""
The sponsor of the Missouri Violence Bill, State Representative
Douglas Harpool, noted in an article he wrote after passage of the Bill by
the Missouri legislature that the Bill was designed to regulate movies
which contain such acts as "graphic sexual torture, bondage, rape, canni-
balism, human brutality and mutilation."'9 Nowhere in Harpool's arti-
cle or other articles written in support of the measure do the supporters
mention regulating words. Thus, based on the statute's language and
supporting material, the Bill does not fall under the fighting or insulting
words exception to the first amendment.
C. Profanity
Since Chaplinsky, a majority of the Supreme Court has not ad-
dressed the profane exception to the first amendment as a separate issue.
Instead, courts have tended to include words which might be considered
"profane" under the clear and present danger or fighting words excep-
tions. For example, in a trilogy of cases decided in 1972, Rosenfeld v.
New Jersey, 9" Lewis v. New Orleans 92 and Brown v. Oklahoma, 9' the
Court considered the convictions for offensive language under state stat-
utes forbidding such conduct.
94
The Trilogy
a. Rosenfeld v. New Jersey
Rosenfeld addressed a public school board meeting attended by
about 150 people, including women and children.95 During the course of
his remarks, he used the word "'m----- ..... -.. '" on four occasions to de-
scribe the teachers, the school board, the town and his own country. 96
89. Mo. REV. STAT. § 573.011(1) (Supp. 1990).
90. Slasher Video Law Draws Contrasting Reviews, THE STATESMAN, July 1989, at 6.
91. 408 U.S. 901 (1972).
92. Id. at 913-14.
93. Id. at 914.
94. Id. at 902-03.
95. Id. at 904.
96. 408 U.S. at 904.
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b. Lewis v. New Orleans
The New Orleans police were in the process of arresting Lewis' son.
She intervened and addressed the police officers as " 'g-- d--- m ----- f-----
police.'" 97
c. Brown v. Oklahoma
Brown spoke to a large group of students gathered in the University
of Tulsa chapel. During a question and answer period, he referred to
some policemen as "'m --- f .... fascist pig cops' " and to a particular
Tulsa police officer as that "black m --- f-----.pig ....'""
The Court summarily vacated and remanded the three convictions
for the use of offensive language. 99 One of the dissenting opinions,"
however, argued that Lewis' words were "fighting words" and that the
words in the other two cases were "lewd and obscene" and "profane"
under the Chaplinsky standard.' ° '
As with the fighting or insulting words exception, the emphasis of
the profane exception is on the words being spoken. The dissent's opin-
ion in the trilogy of cases cited above emphasized the language aspect of
the profane exception. "[T]he exception to the First Amendment protec-
tion is not limited to words whose mere utterance entails a high
probability of an outbreak of physical violence. It also extends to the
willful use of scurrilous language calculated to offend the sensibilities of
an unwilling audience."
' '1 2
Based on the decisions in these cases, it seems clear that the profane
exception's emphasis is on language and not on the action taking place in
videocassettes. Thus, while so-called violent videos may contain strong
language, the Missouri Violence Bill's focus is not to regulate movies
with strong language, but the certain action depicted in the videocasset-
tes. ' 3 Thus, the Bill does not fall under the profane exception to the first
97. Id. at 909 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Lewis was convicted under a New Orleans ordi-
nance providing:
[i]t shall be unlawful and a breach of the peace for any person wantonly to curse or
revile or to use obscene or opprobrious language toward or with reference to any
member of the city police while in the actual performance of his duty. § 49-7, Code
of City of New Orleans.
Id. at 909-10.
98. Id. at 911.
99. Id. at 901-02, 913-14.
100. This dissenting opinion was written by Justice Rehnquist.
101. 408 U.S. at 909-13.
102. Id. at 905 (Powell, J., dissenting).
103. As stated earlier, the Missouri Violence Bill seeks to regulate videocassettes which
depict violence that is patently offensive. Mo. REV. STAT. § 573.011(1) (Supp. 1990).
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amendment.
D. Libel
Libel has been defined as "a maliciously written or printed publica-
tion which tends to blacken a person's reputation.... ."" In New York
Times v. Sullivan, 105 the Supreme Court considered the case of Mont-
gomery, Alabama city commissioner, L.B. Sullivan ("Sullivan") who
claimed he had been libeled by a full-page advertisement which was pub-
lished in the New York Times."° Although Sullivan was never men-
tioned by name in the pro-civil rights advertisement which alleged police
abuses against Martin Luther King, Jr. and civil rights protesters, Sulli-
van claimed the statements1 7 referred to him since his duties included
supervising the city police department."1
At the state trial, it was undisputed that some of the statements in
the paragraphs did not accurately describe events which occurred in
Montgomery." Sullivan, however, made no effort at trial to prove he
had suffered actual pecuniary damages from the alleged libel.110
The trial court submitted the case to the jury with the instructions
that the statements in the advertisement were "libelous per se" and not
privileged. Thus, the petitioners could be held liable if they had pub-
lished the ad and the statements were made about Sullivan.1 II The court
also stated that "falsity and malice are presumed" and that the jurors did
not have to differentiate between compensatory and punitive damages. 
12
104. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 824 (5th ed. 1979).
105. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
106. Id
107. Two of the ten paragraphs in the ad were the basis of the libel claim. They read:
In Montgomery, Alabama, after students sang 'My Country, Tis of Thee' on the
State Capitol steps, their leaders were expelled from school, and truckloads of police
armed with shotguns and tear-gas ringed the Alabama State College Campus. When
the entire student body protested to state authorities by refusing to re-register, their
dining hall was padlocked in an attempt to starve them into submission.
Again and again the Southern violators have answered Dr. King's peaceful pro-
tests with intimidation and violence. They have bombed his home almost killing his
wife and child. They have assaulted his person. They have arrested him seven
times- for 'speeding,' 'loitering,' and similar 'offenses.' And now they have charged
him with 'perjury'- afelony under which they could imprison him for ten years....
376 U.S. at 257-58.
108. Id. at 258.
109. Id.
110. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 260. Approximately 394 copies of the edition of the
Times which contained the advertisement were circulated in Alabama. Of these, about 35
copies were circulated in Montgomery County. The total circulation for the Times on that
date was about 650,000 copies. Id. at 260 n.3.




After its deliberations, the jury awarded Sullivan $500,000. 113 The
Alabama Supreme Court affirmed" 4 and the petitioners appealed to the
United States Supreme Court.'
15
In analyzing the case, the Supreme Court noted "a profound na-
tional commitment to the principal that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehe-
ment, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government
and public officials." ' I6 The Court then set out the new federal rule that
prohibits public officials from recovering damages for a defamatory false-
hood relating to official conduct unless the official can prove that the
statement was made with "actual malice.""' The Court defined actual
malice as a statement made "with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.""'
In overturning the decision, the Court concluded that the facts did
not support a finding of actual malice. 119 At the most, the evidence
against the Times supported "a finding of negligence for failing to dis-
cover the misstatements in the advertisements, and [was] constitutionally
insufficient to show the recklessness ... required for a finding of actual
malice."' 20 In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, I2 ' the Court considered the
case of a Saturday Evening Post feature article which alleged that the
University of Georgia athletic director attempted to "fix" a football game
between his school and the University of Alabama.'22 The Court ana-
lyzed the application of New York Times to the present case and then
fashioned a new rule for a "public figure" who is not a public official.'
23
Such public figures may recover damages for a defamatory falsehood
when substantial danger to the plaintiff's reputation is apparent "on a
showing of highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme depar-
ture from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered
to by responsible publishers."' 24
In affirming the lower court's ruling that the athletic director had
been libeled, the Court noted ample evidence in Curtis Publishing indi-
113. Id. at 256.
114. Id. at 263.
115. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 264.
116. Id. at 270.
117. Id. at 279-80.
118. Id. at 280.
119. Id. at 286.
120. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 288.
121. 388 U.S 130 (1967), reh'g denied, 389 U.S. 889 (1967).
122. Id. at 135.
123. Id. at 155.
124. Id.
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eating a serious departure from good investigative standards of
accuracy.12 5
As cases such as New York Times and Curtis Publishing illustrate,
libel law applies to a narrow range of cases in which a statement was
made with actual malice 26 or the individual did not properly investigate
the defamatory falsehood before reporting it to the public. 27 Although
characters such as Jason in the Friday the 13th 2I movies, Michael My-
ers of the Halloween 129 movies 30 or Freddy Krueger of Nightmare On
Elm Street 131 fame may have "actual malice" against their hapless vic-
tims, these fictional characters are just that - fictional. The libel excep-
tion conceivably applies only to those videocassettes based on readily
identifiable real-life events and individuals.' 32 Even then, the contested
depiction in the videocassette would have to meet the strict standards
outlined in New York Times 133 and Curtis Publishing 134 before the state-
ments or action could be considered libelous.
While a very small percentage of videocassettes might include depic-
tions which fall into this category, 35 trying to include the Bill in the libel
exception would go against the stated intentions of the Bill's sponsor136
since this would effectively gut the Bill and its scope of regulation. This
is because many of the movies which the Bill's sponsor found objectiona-
ble "'37 are based on obviously fictitious characters and story lines.
13 8
Thus, if the Bill was meant to fall under the libel exception, the vast
125. Id. at 158.
126. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80. As stated above, this applies if the individual is a
public official.
127. Curtis Publishing, 388 U.S. at 155.
128. Friday the 13th and its seven sequels (II to VIII) were released by Paramount in 1980,
1981, 1982, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1988 and 1989, respectively.
129. Halloween was released by Compass International Pictures in 1978. Universal Pic-
tures released Halloween 2 and 3 in 1981 and 1983, respectively. Galaxy International released
Halloween 4 in 1988 and Halloween 5 in 1989.
130. These were two of the movie series which the Missouri Bill's sponsor referred to in an
article in THE STATESMAN, July 1989, at 6.
131. Nightmare on Elm Street I to V were released by New Line Cinema in 1984, 1985,
1987, 1988 and 1989, respectively.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 104-27 for libel law requirements.
133. See supra note 132.
134. Id.
135. If any issue was raised, it would more likely be the right to privacy or the right to
publicity. These issues will not be addressed in this comment.
136. The Bill's sponsor, Representative Douglas Harpool, stated, "Missouri is the first state
in the nation to declare excessively violent movies off-limits to minors." Slasher Video Law
Draws Contrasting Reviews, THE STATESMAN, July 1989, at 6.
137. As mentioned earlier, Representative Harpool mentioned Friday the 13th and Hallow-
een and their sequels in an article he wrote defending the Bill after it was passed. Slasher Video
Law Draws Contrasting Reviews, THE STATESMAN, July 1989, at 6.
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majority of so-called violent videos would escape regulation since the
underlying stories and characters are based on a creative screenwriter's
imagination, not reality.
In addition, it requires a long stretch to assume that the Missouri
Violence Bill can skirt first amendment objections to regulation of speech
by pigeonholing "violent" videos into the libel exception of New York
Times 139 and Curtis Publishing.1" The Bill's own language attempts to
regulate the violence in videos, 4 ' not material that could conceivably
libel or defame someone. Thus, the Missouri Violence Bill is not pro-
tected by the libel exception to the first amendment.
E. Bill's Restrictions Cannot Be Justified Under Obscenity Exception
As the Supreme Court held in such cases as Chaplinsky, 142 Roth v.
United States, "I and Miller v. California, ' obscenity is not protected
by the first amendment. Based on the statutory language of the Bill, the
drafters of the Missouri statute chose to base their restrictions on the
obscenity standard created by the Supreme Court in Miller. "I The stan-
dard provided by the Miller court depends on
whether 'the average person, applying contemporary commu-
nity standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, ap-
peals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or
describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifi-
cally defined by applicable state law; and (c) whether the work,
taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or sci-
entific value. 1
In the Missouri Violence Bill, the drafters generally substituted the word
"violence" for "sex."'147
138. For example, in the Friday the 13th movies, Jason keeps coming back to kill his hapless
victims, despite the fact that he has received fatal wounds on numerous occasions.
139. See supra text accompanying notes 104-27 for libel law requirements.
140. See supra note 132.
141. The Bill would regulate videocassettes if they meet a three-part test which includes
appealing to a "morbid interest in violence" and "depicting violence in a way that is patently
offensive." Mo. REV. STAT. § 573.011(1) (Supp. 1990).
142. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
143. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
144. 413 U.S. 15 (1973), reh'g denied, 414 U.S. 881 (1973).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 24 (citations omitted).
147. As stated earlier, the Missouri Violence Bill includes this language:
(1) Taken as a whole and applying contemporary community standards, the average
person would find that it has a tendency to cater or appeal to morbid interest in
violence for persons under the age of seventeen; and
(2) It depicts violence in a way which is patently offensive to the average person
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At first glance, this statutory construction patterned after Miller
seems to allow state regulation of violent videocassettes because the Bill
uses virtually identical language to the three-part Miller test. In fact,
Missouri Governor Ashcroft drew this parallel when he described the
Bill's provisions as dealing with a "new class of pornography.""14 How-
ever, as case law illustrates, the Miller rule cannot be extended this far
since it was designed to cover obscenity only.149
In Sovereign News Co. v. Falke, '50 a United States District Court
considered an Ohio obscenity statute which included in its definition of
obscene materials or performances those whose "dominant tendency is to
arouse lust by displaying or depicting ... extreme or bizarre violence,
cruelty, or brutality ....
In finding the statute unconstitutional, the court relied on the Miller
test to reach its decision. 152 The court emphasized that only material
depicting or describing sexual conduct can be regulated because it is ob-
scene.' Material that contains violence, brutality or cruelty cannot be
considered obscene unless it also depicts or describes sexual conduct. 1
54
The court stated that "[m]aterial limited to forms of violence is therefore
given the highest degree of protection, i.e., it may not be restricted unless
it is shown to constitute a clear and present danger to society."' 55 Thus,
the court concluded, the Ohio statute unconstitutionally restrained free
expression. '
5 6
In American Booksellers Association, Inc. v. Hudnut, '1 the Seventh
Circuit considered an Indianapolis, Indiana ordinance which included in
its definition of pornography those books, pictures or films which
subordinated women, presented women as enjoying pain, humiliation, or
rape, in scenarios of injury or torture or in positions of servility or sub-
applying contemporary adult community standards with respect to what is suitable
for a person under the age of seventeen; and
(3) Taken as a whole, it lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for
persons under the age of seventeen.
Mo. REV. STAT. § 573.010 (Supp. 1990).
148. "Ashcroft Signs Video Bill," United Press Int'l, June 21, 1989 (NEXIS, videos).
149. See infra text accompanying notes 150-64.
150. 448 F. Supp. 306 (N.D. Ohio 1977), remanded on other grounds sub nom. Sovereign
News Co. v. Corrigan, 610 F.2d 428 (6th Cir. 1979).
151. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.01 (F)(3) (cited in Sovereign News Co. v. Falke, 448 F.
Supp. at 398-99 (1979)).
152. Sovereign News, 448 F. Supp. at 393-98, 400-03.
153. Id. at 394 (citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1972)).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 400.
157. 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985).
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mission or display. 58 Speech that portrayed women in positions of
equality was lawful, regardless of how graphic the sexual content. 59
In overturning the law, the court noted that the ordinance did not
include all the required elements of the three-part Miller test' 60 and un-
constitutionally expanded the definition of pornography to include vio-
lent acts against women.' 6 ' The court emphasized that the government
has no power to restrict expression because of its message or ideas.'
62
Thus, the court concluded that the ordinance amounted to thought con-
trol because it established an approved view of women, how they react to
sexual encounters, and how the sexes may relate to each other. 163
As these opinions illustrate, courts have narrowly limited the Miller
rule to obscenity only since the Miller rule was created to deal with state
regulations of "works which depict or describe sexual conduct."'" The
Supreme Court made it clear in an earlier decision, Winters v. New
York, 1 65 that material deemed violent falls within the first amendment
protection. In this case, the Court considered a New York statute that
made it illegal to distribute publications principally made up of criminal
news, police reports, or accounts of criminal deeds which the state had
found were packaged so that the publications "became vehicles for incit-
ing violent and depraved crimes."' 166 While the Court recognized that
the magazines had little or no serious value, it found them protected by
158. Id. at 324 (citing Indianapolis Code § 16-3(q)).
159. American Booksellers Ass'n, 771 F.2d at 325.
160. Id. at 324-25.
161. Id. at 324, 332. The city's definition of pornography under Indianapolis Code § 16-
3(q) was:
the graphic sexual subordination of women, whether in pictures or words, that in-
cludes one or more of the following:
(1) Women are presented as sexual objects who enjoy pain or humiliation; or
(2) Women are presented as sexual objects who experience sexual pleasure in
being raped; or
(3) Women are presented as sexual objects tied up or cut up or mutilated or
bruised or physically hurt, or as dismembered or truncated or fragmented or severed
into body parts; or
(4) Women are presented as being penetrated by objects or animals; or
(5) Women are presented in scenarios of degradation, injury, abasement, torture,
shown as filthy or inferior, bleeding, bruised, or hurt in a context that makes these
conditions sexual; or
(6) Women are presented as sexual objects for domination, conquest, violation,
exploitation, possession, or use, or through postures or positions or servility or sub-
mission or display.
Id. at 324.
162. Id. at 328 (citing Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972)).
163. Id.
164. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
165. 333 U.S. 507, 540 (1948).
166. Id. at 513.
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the first amendment: "[t]hough we can see nothing of any possible value
to society in these magazines, they are as much entitled to the protection
of free speech as the best of literature."
1 67
Based on these decisions, the obscenity exception applies only to
material deemed obscene. 168 Thus, even though the Missouri Violence
Bill is patterned after the three-part Miller obscenity test, the Bill cannot
fall under the obscenity exception to the first amendment since its pur-
pose is to regulate material deemed violent and not material deemed
obscene. 1
69
Because the Bill does not fall under the obscenity or any other first
amendment exceptions, the Bill has fatal constitutional flaws. As the
Supreme Court noted in Gooding v. Wilson, 171 "the statute [regulating
speech] must be carefully drawn or authoritatively construed to punish
only unprotected speech and not be susceptible of application to pro-
tected expression."'
17 1
The Missouri statute is not carefully drawn nor has it been authori-
tatively construed to punish unprotected speech since the Bill's explicit
purpose is to regulate videocassettes deemed "violent." Yet violence is a
form of first amendment expression which the Sovereign News 172 and
Winters 17 courts held to be protected expression.
This fatal flaw alone renders the Bill unconstitutional. The Missouri
Violence Bill, however, has other problems which demonstrate further
constitutional flaws.
IV. THE BILL'S STANDARDS FOR IDENTIFYING EXPRESSION
SUBJECT TO GOVERNMENT RESTRICTION ARE VAGUE AND
ILL-DEFINED
The Supreme Court stated in Smith v. Goguen 174 that "[n]o one may
167. Id. Subsequent decisions by state courts have relied on Winters to overturn state stat-
utes which attempted to regulate "crime comic books." For example, in Police Commissioner
of Baltimore City v. Siegal Enter., 223 Md. 110, 122 (1960), the Maryland Court of Appeals
overturned the Crime Comic Books Act of Maryland (Code, 1957, Art. 27, § 420-25, as
amended by ch. 197 of the Acts of 1959). In Katzev v. County of Los Angeles, 52 Cal.2d 360,
341 P.2d 310 (1959), the California Supreme Court held unconstitutional a Los Angeles crime
comic book ordinance which made it a misdemeanor to sell or exhibit certain publications to
children under eighteen.
168. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 and Sovereign News, 448 F. Supp. at 394.
169. See supra note 7.
170. 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
171. Id. at 522.
172. 448 F. Supp. at 306. See supra text accompanying notes 150-56.
173. 333 U.S. 507. See supra text accompanying notes 165-67.
174. 415 U.S. 566 (1974).
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be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the mean-
ing of penal statutes. All are entitled to be informed as to what the state
commands or forbids. '"" This poses a problem for the Missouri Vio-
lence Bill because the Bill establishes regulations for "violent" videos
without providing a definition of what "violent" means.
In Goguen, the Court stated that where the statute's literal scope can
reach expression sheltered by the first amendment, the doctrine of fair
notice demands a greater degree of specificity than in other contexts.
1 76
That doctrine "requires legislatures to set reasonably clear guidelines for
law enforcement officers and triers of fact ... to prevent 'arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement.' ",177
The Bill, however, fails to do that. For example, what constitutes a
"morbid interest in violence"1 78 or "violence... which is patently offen-
sive to the average person... ." ,?179 While one Missouri county prosecu-
tor may find that videos of Friday the 13th or Nightmare on Elm Street fit
within this statutory language, another may decide that videos of boxing,
wrestling, football, a war movie, or Road Runner cartoons violate the
law.
This inherent vagueness requires a video store operator to guess at
the prosecutorial standard which would be used in his or her county.
This uncertainty may have a profound effect on the distribution of video-
cassettes in Missouri. As the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals noted in
Pratt v. Independent School Dist., "so
when one must guess what conduct or utterance may lose him
his position, one necessarily will 'steer far wider of the unlawful
zone .... ' The danger of that chilling effect upon the exercise of
vital First Amendment rights must be guarded against by sensi-
tive tools which clearly inform ... what is being proscribed. 181
Sensitive, well-defined standards are important since "[d]ue process
requires that 'all be informed as to what the State commands or for-
bids.' "82 Also, the Court has held "that 'men of common intelligence'
175. Id. at 572 n.8 (citing Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939)).
176. Id. at 573 (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972) and Smith v.
California, 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959)).
177. Goguen, 415 U.S. at 572-73 (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09
(1972)).
178. Mo. REV. STAT. § 573.01 1(1) (Supp. 1990).
179. Id. For a full text of the statement, see the first section of this comment.
180. 670 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1982).
181. Id. at 778 (emphasis in original) (citing Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589,
603-04 (1967)).
182. Goguen, 415 U.S. at 574 (citing Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939)).
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[should] not be forced to guess at the meaning of a criminal law."' 83 The
challenged provisions of the Missouri Violence Bill are not sufficiently
defined to ensure proper, fair enforcement, and thus, must fail because
they are unconstitutionally vague.
V. THE BILL'S PROVISIONS VIOLATE THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT'S EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
The fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause requires that
"no State shall 'deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the law," 84 which is essentially a direction that all persons
similarly situated should be treated alike."' 5 While state legislatures
must be given substantial latitude in establishing classifications which
roughly approximate the nature of the problem perceived,' 86 the
Supreme Court has said it would not apply so deferential a standard to
state legislative action which is inconsistent with basic constitutional
premises. 1
87
The Court stated it would treat as "presumptively invidious" classi-
fications which disadvantage a suspect class or impinge on the exercise of
a fundamental right. 8 Under the Missouri Violence Bill, the state cre-
ated two classifications: (1) videocassettes and other video reproduction
devices which are subject to the restrictions; and (2) all other communi-
cation media which are not subject to any restrictions.'89 Since the Bill
impinges on the exercise of a fundamental right, 90 the state of Missouri
is required to demonstrate that its classification has been precisely tai-
lored to serve a compelling government interest. '9'
Missouri cannot do that. Although information about the Bill was
conveyed at the bill signing ceremony' 92 and in articles published after
183. Id. (citing Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)).
184. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
185. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Centers, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).
186. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 216-17.
189. According to the language of the Bill, the only items regulated are "[v]ideo cassettes or
other video reproduction devices, or the jackets, cases or coverings of such video reproduction
devices shall be displayed or maintained in a separate area" if they meet the three-part test
outlined in the first section of this comment. Mo. REV. STAT. § 573.011 (Supp. 1990).
190. Since motion pictures are included in the free speech and free press guaranty of the
first and fourteenth amendments, the Missouri Violence Bill affects a fundamental right be-
cause a fundamental right is a right which has its source in the Constitution. Plyler, 457 U.S. at
217 n.15.
191. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 217.
192. Governor Ashcroft was quoted as saying that the measure would "give local prosecu-
tors better authority to fight the scourge of pornography that threatens our families and com-
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passage of the Bill,' 93 the Bill contains no description of its goals or pur-
poses. No legislative history of committee meetings or debates exists to
show the state's purpose for the Bill's classification.' 94 Even the Bill's
subheading-"An Act [t]o repeal section 573.010, RSMo Supp. 1988,
relating to offenses relating to pornography. . ."-does not provide any
additional information about the basis for the classification system.
The Bill's classification scheme is a shotgun approach to regulating
this area. While the Bill would regulate the sale and rental of videos
described by the law to those under seventeen,' 95 it places no restrictions
on identical speech conveyed through network, independent, cable and
pay television and movie and drive-in theaters. Nor do the Bill's provi-
sions attempt to regulate access to books or magazines containing identi-
cal material meeting the Bill's restrictions.
196
In addition, the Bill would require separate display of the jackets of
videocassettes which meet the Bill's three-part test.' However, a poster
showing the same jacket photograph or illustration could be legally dis-
played in the store window or used to advertise the videocassette in every
newspaper, magazine, and television station that reaches the state of
Missouri.
It is apparent that the state of Missouri failed to precisely tailor its
classification to serve a compelling government interest, as is required for
regulation of fundamental rights. 198 Instead, the state singled out one
method of conveying protected speech for regulation for no apparent rea-
son, while leaving other forms of communicating the identical speech un-
regulated. Since there is no compelling reason for this type of regulation,
the Bill violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
VI. POSSIBLE RESULTS IF THE BILL Is HELD CONSTITUTIONAL:
COMMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS
The Missouri Violence Bill is unconstitutional on a number of
munities. This bill deals with a new class of pornography that we see on the rise, films that
cater to a morbid interest in violence." "Ashcroft Signs Video Bill," United Press Int'l, June
21, 1989 (NEXIS, videos).
193. See, e.g., "No 'Slasher' Movies for Missouri Kids," GOVERNING, Aug. 1989, at 13-14,
and "'Slasher Video' Law Draws Contrasting Reviews," THE STATESMAN, July 1989, at 6.
194. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, at 27,
VSDA v. Webster, Civil Action No. 89-4353-CVC-9 (1989).
195. Mo. REV. STAT. § 573.01 1(1) (Supp. 1990).
196. Such restrictions were expressly forbidden by the Supreme Court in Winters, discussed
supra in text accompanying footnotes 165-67.
197. Mo. REV. STAT. § 573.011(1) (Supp. 1990).
198. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216-17.
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grounds: the Bill's purpose to declare excessively violent videos off limits
does not fall into any of the exceptions to first amendment protection 99
which permit state regulation; the Bill's standards for identifying expres-
sion subject to government restriction are vague and ill-defined; and the
Bill violates the equal protection clause.
If the United States District Court upholds the Missouri Bill, the
results could destroy first amendment rights for those individuals whose
beliefs and expressions are outside of the mainstream of American soci-
ety. In fact, any kind of unpopular speech could be placed at the mercy
of unpredictable jury verdicts, thus leaving the police, courts and juries
free to react on the basis of nothing more than their own preferences and
biases. Thus, by changing a few key words in the Miller test so it relates
to the kind of speech which a state wants to regulate, censorship which
goes totally against the first amendment could be enacted.
For example, state or federal governments could outlaw certain reli-
gious beliefs by using the Miller pattern. Thus, unpopular beliefs would
be punished if those beliefs appeal to the prurient interest in religion,
depict religious conduct specifically defined by state law, and lack serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. While this scenario may
seem farfetched, it is plausible given the groundswell of support for
groups which seek to silence or stop the activities of other groups which
espouse views diametrically opposed to their own.2°
Affirmance of the Missouri Violence Bill could be a major step in
chipping away at the first amendment rights which Americans have val-
ued and treasured for more than 200 years. The United States District
Court for the Western District of Missouri should protect the integrity of
the United States Constitution by turning back this attempt to circum-
vent its principles and rule that the Missouri Violence Bill is
unconstitutional.
Kenneth D. Rozell
199. "These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or
'fighting' words-those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an imme-
diate breach of the peace." Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
200. For example, anti-abortion groups have attempted to shut down abortion clinics
through such tactics as harassing potential patients and employees of the clinics, blocking
entrances to the clinics, repeatedly making false appointments and placing as many as 700
telephone hang-up calls a day. "Courts Deal Blockaders Big Setbacks," The Nat'l L. J., Nov.
13, 1989, at 30, 32. Conservatives in Congress have spearheaded a reduction of funding for the
National Endowment of the Arts ("NEA") due to conservative's displeasure with art exhibits
sponsored by the NEA. See L.A. Times, Nov. 20, 1989, at F2, col. 2.
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